INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to answer the question: In what sense can Alain Badiou's idea of evental grace, conceived of as radically immanent, be understood as the continuation of the legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's nonreligious interpretation? The thematic scope of my analysis is determined by two factors: first, the notions of "religionless Christianity" and "immanent grace" which, as I will argue, despite the evident discrepancy between Bonhoeffer's and Badiou's ontological backgrounds, allow for grasping some analogies between both their general insights and particular views and, second, the willingness to preserve the integrity of each approach. In order to meet the latter requirement I will, first, examine the contexts of Bonhoeffer's concept of worldly faith and Badiou's concept of immanently actual infinity one by one, through the lens of their respective agendas. Only then several analogies among them will be suggested by pointing to the essential continuity of Bonhoeffer's legacy in Badiou with concurrent discontinuity regarding both the ontological basis and the theological implications of their views. Finally, I will suggest a possible message that the trajectory of thought indicated by Bonhoeffer and Badiou might convey to Christianity today.
It ought to be mentioned that while Bonhoeffer's theology constitutes the proper and direct object of this study, my treatment of Badiou's philosophy assumes an effort of appropriating his thought theologically, which in itself constitutes an unobvious and often audacious task.
SEARCHING CHRIST'S PRESENCE IN THE WORLD COME OF AGE
A German Lutheran pastor-martyr and one of the most influential theologians of the last century, Dietrich Bonhoeffer continues to inspire and puzzle Christian thinkers of various denominations and theological schools. Overshadowed by the dramatic events of his life that came to an end on April 9
th , 1945 at Flossenbürg, his theology has nonetheless provoked numerous responses. In particular, his notion of "religionless" has received various interpretations. When Bonhoeffer predicts the religionless age, some celebrate him as an "elemental believer" (B. Jaspert) or as a "religious naturalist" (J. Macquarrie), while others reproach him as an "atheist" (A. MacIntyre) or "secularist" (A. Leon). Also many of the "death of God" theologians in the 1960s saw Bonhoeffer as their patron (cf. W. Hamilton). iv As Wüstenberg rightly points out, to prevent "nonreligious interpretation" from degenerating into a slogan for a wide range of theological trends one cannot allow certain catch-phrases, such as "religionless Christianity," to be worked up into systems of thought sharply opposed to Bonhoeffer's basic Christian theology-not least his Christology.
v "What is bothering me incessantly is the question what Christianity really is, or
indeed who Christ really is, for us today." vi These concerns constitute the organizing principle, the true North Star in Bonhoeffer's life and theology. From that point of view, the topic of religion as such is not even of central significance for the cluster of problems surrounding the nonreligious interpretation. Bonhoeffer's systematic-theological focus does not reside in the critique of religion in the first place vii but points rather to the Christological "logical conclusion" of the critique of religion is for Bonhoeffer a "nonreligious interpretation" which never appears in Barth and which can no longer be interpreted against the background of dialectical theology. Once again, its pivotal elements will be examined shortly in connection with the philosophy of Badiou.
PHILOSOPHIZING ON RESURRECTION AS A TRUTH-EVENT
Alain Badiou is seen by many as one of the most idiosyncratic and thought-provoking European philosophers today. xxiv According to Badiou, our embeddedness in the customs and opinions of the world we inhabit is structurally susceptible to disruptions that compel us to decide a new way of being. xxv Such disruptions or ruptures (truth-events) bring about a transformation of the social animal that one was into the human subject one is to become;
Badiou refers to this process as "subjectivation:" xxvi "A socialized animal is convoked by certain circumstances to become a subject-or rather, to enter into the composing of a subject." xxvii In the same vein, Badiou, who identifies himself with an anti-postmodern strand of continental philosophy, diagnoses the reasons for the illness of contemporary philosophy in its various forms: the hermeneutic, analytic or postmodern orientations of philosophy "are too compatible with our world to be able to sustain the rupture or distance that philosophy requires." xxviii In this case, the rupture assumes two things, namely the rejection of the misconception that language is the ultimate horizon of human existence (the reversal of the so-called linguistic turn) and the philosophical interruption of the speedy process of history by establishing a fixed and unconditional point within discourse. Curing philosophy, or making again true philosophy of it, is the task to which Badiou has set himself and which he sees himself fulfilling in his doctrine of the event, xxix which also entails a new theory of the subject and a new understanding of truth. "theoretical" reading of Paul is his search for "a new militant figure," one who could replace the party militant, i.e., the type of militant figure founded by Lenin which has now become obsolete. xxxix Badiou presents the apostle as an eminent example of a "revolutionary subjectivity which emerges in the wake of an event and consists in one's fidelity to that event." xl Badiou's intention is neither historicizing nor exegetical, but rather subjective through and through, confined to the relation that Paul's texts bear to his own thought. Based on a non-hermeneutical reading of the Pauline letters he proposes a picture of Paul as a "poetthinker of the event," xli in which the dominant feature is his commitment to universal truth.
This truth "is not produced by objective circumstances-a people, a kingdom, a city or a social class-but by a single event," xlii namely the resurrection.
In the manner of Paul's discussion of the resurrection, Badiou discovers the epistemological basis for the apprehension of universal truth. xliii However, he is concerned solely with the formal structure of Paul's truth-claim, while explicitly rejecting Paul's cosmology and the whole content of the Christian doctrine. For this self-confessed atheist, the resurrection is a fable from which he means "to extract a formal, wholly secularised there is no "island of the blessed," no quiet little religious room where we are alone, "no place where the Christian can withdraw from the world either outwardly or within the inner sphere," lx pleasant as this might be. As Christ was wholly the world's, so the Christian should be wholly Christ's and simultaneously stand in the world; worldly existence and Christian existence are to be fully integrated. While religion separates the world into two spheres, sacred and secular, the God of religionless Christianity calls us to understand all reality as sacred and sacramental, as "holiness incognito" which never manifests itself in terms of other-worldliness but can be made known only through our willingness to manifest it. "What is important, therefore, is to be part of God's and the world's reality in Jesus Christ today in such a way that it is impossible for me to experience the reality of God without the reality of the world or the reality of the world without the reality of God." lxi The radicalism of this statement, which draws its intuition from the "logic of incarnation," is striking.
Nietzsche reproached Paul for shifting "the center of gravity of the entire existence beyond this existence-into the lie of the 'resurrected' Jesus." lxii Badiou, on the contrary, sees in the resurrection "that on the basis of which life's center of gravity comes to reside in life, whereas previously, being situated in the Law, it organized life's subsumption by death." lxiii Resurrection establishes the unconditional point of interruption, the point of discontinuing death's rule and, hence, allowing life to take revenge on death here and now, enabling the subject to "live affirmatively, according to the spirit, rather than negatively, according to the flesh, which is the thought of death." lxiv This usage of the categories of "life" and "death" corresponds to the hope that humanity can now vanquish death and affirm life in the contingent sense, rather than by trusting in a literal or physical promise of resurrection: death and life are paths that can be chosen here and now, there is no need to transpose them into the transcendent dimension. In order for ontology to be ultimately freed from ontotheological trappings Badiou adopts "the thesis of the infinity of being" itself. the thought of an immanent grace is that the resurrection of Jesus puts Paul in a peculiar conceptual position: he is forced to think about grace given the fact that the Messiah has already come and actually accomplished our redemption. "Though Paul's thought does not proceed without reference to a supernatural order beyond our own, he still must account for how God's grace can be both immanent (it is already here) and actually given (it is not simply latently potential)-all despite the fact that the world has not ended but continues on as if nothing has happened." lxxi Badiou follows in Paul's steps, as it were, freeing his "theory of truth" from unnecessary reference to transcendence.
Both Bonhoeffer and Badiou direct our attention towards this-worldliness / immanence, though they do so for different reasons. While Bonhoeffer claims that God makes God's own self communicable but through what is human, Badiou insists that the infinite as such is not divine but radically immanent, i.e., equivalent to being qua being. From an ontological point of view, their positions can be seen as parallel only in a very limited sense. However, if we look at them through the prism of the question of God's "availability" to the human being or his presence in the world, the conception of immanent grace, based on Badiou's ontology, can offer a surprisingly adequate answer to Bonhoeffer's Christological concerns: Who is Christ for us today, in the world come of age?
Being for Others and Declaring the Event: The Only "Weapons" of the Believer
In Discipleship Bonhoeffer writes, "The word of Jesus keeps its honor, its strength, and power among us only by our acting on it. Then a storm can sweep over the house, but it cannot tear apart the unity with Jesus created by his word." lxxii By stressing that the gospel is bodiless in the world unless we incorporate it through our action Bonhoeffer by no means attempts to reduce the Christian ethos to its horizontal dimension. lxxiii Rather, he wants us to recognize the unique means and realization of Jesus's being for others in the world today in our own readiness to follow in his footsteps. The negative side of this truth is reflected in his bold claim that "neither knowledge, nor morality, nor religion leads to God." lxxiv For Badiou, the event puts language into deadlock which is folly (mōria) for Greek discourse and a scandal (skandalon) for Jewish discourse. lxxv While the former demands logical reasons, the latter "insists on a sign of divine power and sees in Christ nothing but weakness, abjection, and contemptible peripeteia." lxxvi As a consequence, the apostle who does not have prophetic or miraculous guarantees, arguments or proofs, at his disposal can only declare "an unheard of possibility, one dependent on evental grace" lxxvii of resurrection and, then, remain faithful to it by the "rude harshness of public action." lxxviii In this section, I will examine Bonhoeffer's critique of religion and morality as analogical to Badiou's approach to Greek and Jewish discourses as well as Bonhoeffer's notion of participating in Jesus's being for others and
Badiou's understanding of declaration.
Bonhoeffer considers religion and morality to be "the greatest danger for recognizing divine grace, since they bear within themselves the seed prompting us to seek our path to God ourselves." lxxix Knowledge, either religious or moral, represents to him the path from human beings to God which unavoidably "leads to the idol of our hearts which we have formed after our own image." lxxx In his theology, Bonhoeffer focuses on the critique of religion, whereas the critique of morality remains implicit. First, he accuses religion of absolutist tendencies and partiality that cause it to fail to concur with life. lxxxi Religion dichotomizes the world along the lines of the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the secular, the saved and the damned, and perhaps most insidiously, the good and the evil, lxxxii which is radically opposed to the "totality" and "integrity" of a lived faith. Second, religious discourse is defined in terms of temporarily conditioned presuppositions of metaphysics and inwardness (or individualism but it does simply and emphatically declare the fact of its having happened. xc Apart from this negative aspect, however, the same evental nature of the truth -i.e., the fact that it can be grasped only through declaration -appears in Badiou as that which accounts for subjectivation. Put simply, only the evental truth constitutes and founds the subject. Paul's situation-and, in a broader sense, the situation of every believer (or "apostle,"
as Badiou calls the one who declares the event)-can be described as dominated by the rule of two related but distinguishable "regimes of discourse": Jewish discourse and Greek discourse.
The prophet who predicts through figures or signs is the figure of the Jewish discourse, whereas the philosopher who attempts to speak of eternal truths is the figure of the Greek one. Together with the specifically Christian (in a strict sense, Pauline) discourse of the evental declaration, they constitute three discourses whose subjective postures are: to demand-to question-to declare. xcii The fourth discourse (miraculous or mystical), according to Badiou, must remain unaddressed: it cannot enter into the realm of preaching, for it is "vain to want to justify a declaratory stance through the appeal of miracle." xciii The intersection of law (Jewish or Greek) with sin is considered by Badiou the central problem recurring in almost all the Pauline epistles. Sin is not conceived of in terms of individual fault but as "living thought's inability to prescribe action." xciv If we were able to save ourselves, we would not be in sin. But since it is beyond our capabilities, an event (resurrection) must intervene in order for the oppressive automatism of the law to be interrupted. xcv As Badiou contends, "Paul's project is to show that a universal logic of salvation cannot be reconciled with any law, be it one that ties thought to the cosmos, or one that fixes the effects of an exceptional election." xcvi However, Badiou goes further by stating that if the event were transcendent, as Paul maintains, it would be likely to simply duplicate the Jewish logic of divine exception and leave the measure of the law intact-hence his conclusion that the event must be of an immanent nature.
xcvii In Badiouan ontology, the role of the absolute infinite (divine) has been taken by "the void" conceived of as the "errant 'place' where each situation is sutured to its being qua pure multiplicity or inconsistency." xcviii In other words, "the fundamental ontological characteristic of an event is to inscribe, to name the situated void of that for which it is an event." xcix According to Welborn, that explains why Paul is seen by Badiou as a foundational figure and the first great theoretician of universal truth:
[U]nlike effective truth-procedures which aim at the production of a universal in the domains of science, art, politics, and love, there occurs with Paul a powerful break … which deserves to be called 'theoretical', c because the situated void which Paul's proclamation inscribes and names is nothing other than death itself. Paul's declaration 'Christ is resurrected' blasts open the continuum constructed around death.
ci Reynhout, in turn, in his attempt to appropriate Badiou's thought theologically, comes to the conclusion that allows him to ultimately identify this nameless void with God, thus falling back on Tillich's designations of God as "being-itself" or the "ground of being." cii Depoortere depicts the analogy pointedly: "Just as zero or the empty set cannot be deduced, but has to be decided upon axiomatically, the being of God cannot be demonstrated, but has to be declared." "It will be a new language, perhaps completely unreligious, but liberating and redemptive, like the language of Jesus." cix According to Badiou, the event is logical rather than phenomenological, which is to say, it draws from presentation itself. Thus the initial intervention is purely "of the order of declaration." cx It does not declare the meaning of an event, but it simply and emphatically declares the fact of its having happened: "there is an event, it has consequences, and these consequences need to be faithfully elaborated in relation to the status quo that has been interrupted." cxi From the conditions of his own "conversion" Paul draws the consequence that one can only begin from the declaration of the resurrection being the "real of faith," a declaration which is in essence subjective, for no preconstituted subset can support it. cxii The apostle must be accountable only for what others see and hear, i.e., for his or her declaration. cxiii It is the essence of faith to publicly declare itself; even though private conviction is required, only the public confession of faith installs the subject in the perspective of salvation. cxiv The truth of a declaration, being without proof or visibility, emerges at that point where knowledge, be it empirical or conceptual, breaks down. Hence
Paul's "antiphilosophy:" apostolic declaration stems from and gives expression to a pure fidelity toward the possibility opened by the event.
cxv If truths lack objective strength, then their substance must be provided by the subjective persistence of fidelity which supplies the truth procedure with consistency. cxvi The substance of truth is faith. Fidelity is to be seen not as "a capacity, a subjective quantity, or a virtue" but as "a functional relation to an event." cxvii Miller rightly points out that "whether finitude or infinity prevails depends on the decision that is made in relation to the event. Only an intervention, by declaring the existence of the event, is able to decide in favor of infinity." cxviii In other words, the relevance of the event to the life of others is contingent exclusively on the apostle's fidelity towards that event.
Since the truth is proclaimed and not proven, it implies the "language of the naked event, which alone captures thought." cxix Badiou describes it only in negative terms: "What imposes the invention of a new discourse, and of a subjectivity that is neither philosophical nor prophetic (the apostle), is precisely that it is only by means of such invention that the event finds a welcome and an existence in language. For established languages, it is inadmissible because it is genuinely unnamable." cxx But he gives us a hint as to how a language in which "event finds a welcome and an existence" might look like when he says that all true names to which the subject of a truth lays claim are, like Jesus's name (cf. Phil. 2:9), i.e., above every name. "They let themselves be inflected and declared, just as mathematical symbolism does, in every language, according to every custom, and through the traversal of all differences." cxxi Bonhoeffer's critique of religion and morality and Badiou's approach to Greek and Jewish discourses share an underlying negative, anti-idolatrous intuition which allows
Bonhoeffer to preserve the holistic and gratuitous character of faith concurring with life and which enables Badiou to speak of the content of the "resurrection truth-event" as the exclusive source of the declaration's force. Bonhoeffer focuses on acting on the word of Jesus by the participation in Jesus's being for others, whereas Badiou stresses the importance of declaring the event by the subjective persistence of fidelity that constitutes truth's substance.
But in both cases, faith seen as the only accurate response to Jesus's call to discipleship (Bonhoeffer)/the event interrupting the old order (Badiou) presupposes some sort of ontological "empty space" or "void" that makes faith as such possible and results in a new type of language which breaks up with traditional religious discourses.
Theologia Crucis and the Militant Discourse of Weakness: Power in Powerlessness
Bonhoeffer maintains that what ultimately distinguishes Christians from both pagans and "religious people" is that they stand by God in God's suffering. "'Could you not keep awake one hour?' Jesus asks in Gethsemane. This is the reversal of everything a religious person expects from God. Human beings are called to suffer God's own suffering at the hands of the godless world." cxxii Thus for Bonhoeffer theologia crucis becomes the distinctive mark between the religious and nonreligious interpretation. Badiou claims, in turn, that the power of a truth is only "fulfilled in weakness itself" cxxiii or, to put it in reverse, that the weakness of the Christian declaration constitutes its only strength. Such a declaration nourishes itself on the "inglorious evidence of weakness," cxxiv At this point, I will probe these two visions of the "power stemming from powerlessness" as well as their Christological contexts and practical ramifications. Christ." cxxvii One of the reasons why Bonhoeffer resonated so strongly with the theologians of liberation is that he grasped that the way one responds to suffering corresponds in no small measure to the ways that one defines God. cxxviii The God projected into the other-worldliness is de facto a "false God," a vision of God that often occludes the God found in the gospels, namely the "crucified God" who wins power and space in the world by weakness. Thus the incarnate presence of God in Christ makes Bonhoeffer sensitive to the universality of suffering in the world and leads him to admit that only the suffering God can help. cxxix Bonhoeffer believed that Christianity must be something more than the cultural constructions of whatever society it is known within; indeed, when necessary, it must take its stand against the prevailing political and moral orders. cxxx Even though the embrace of a religionless Christianity takes us to a place of suffering the cross, for Bonhoeffer it has nothing to do with escaping the world in individual piety or otherworldly mysticism. Rather by our very immersion and being in the world-sharing its duties, sorrows, and sufferings-we gain the credibility and authority to call the world into question. Willingness to suffer the wounds of the wounded themselves is by no means equivalent to a move to passivity and surrender to worldly powers; rather it constitutes a place of profound power in powerlessness. cxxxi Pugh even speculates that a "religionless Christianity could well take the form of public resistance to the 'way things are'." cxxxii Bonhoeffer stresses, however, that confronting power may never come from our power but from the powerlessness that God's own self experiences in the cross of Jesus. This awareness results in Bonhoeffer's radical conviction regarding the role of ecclesia in the world: "The church can defend its own sphere … only by battling, not for that sphere but for the salvation of the world. Otherwise the church degenerates into a 'religious society', fighting for its own existence, and thus automatically is no longer God's church in the world." the profane, the revelational only in the rational." cxxxviii It can be said that the nonreligious interpretation is a "life-Christological interpretation relating Christian faith and life come of age to one another" cxxxix that aims at inventing the new language capable of grasping the ultimate meaning that Christ's incarnation bears for this-worldliness.
As we have seen, for Badiou proceeding from the truth-event delivers no law and thus no form of mastery, be it that of the wise man (sic) or the prophet. cxl "If one demands signs, he who performs them in abundance becomes a master for him who demands them. If one questions philosophically, he who can reply becomes a master for the perplexed subject. But he who declares … does not enter into the logic of the master. ... To declare an event is to become the son of that event." cxli When Paul leaves for Arabia in order to proclaim the gospel, he is armed solely with a personal event which, nonetheless, provides him with grounds for declaring that impersonal event that is the resurrection. cxlii As Badiou puts it, Paul "firmly holds to the militant discourse of weakness" cxliii knowing that he must leave truth to its subjective "voicelessness" for only the work of its declaration ensures its continuation.
One of Badiou's central insights is that the militant apparatus of truth can only be achieved by going against the flow of the world, cxliv which reminds us that-once emptied of its theological content-the structure of Paul's proclamation has, for Badiou, contemporary political significance. In this sense, he discovers in Paul a thinker whose legacy contains revolutionary potential even today" and in whose proclamation of the event of Christ's resurrection as "truth for all" lies the "theoretical basis for continued engagement in revolutionary thought and politics." which feeds only on its own content-in either case, it constitutes the subject and paradoxically empowers it to go against the flow of the world whenever the world, in the name of some larger cause, inflicts suffering on the powerless (Bonhoeffer) or prevents the "apostle" from being faithful to the truth-event that has been named in the resurrection (Badiou) .
WORLDLY FAITH IN THE EVENT: TOWARDS A RADICAL ECCLESIOLOGY
In my examination of Bonhoeffer's notion of religionless Christianity and Badiou's notion of evental grace, I have attempted to prove that the latter can be interpreted as the continuation of the former, though only in a sense and to a degree to which radical discontinuity between the two does not occur. Now, drawing on the reflection of both Bonhoeffer and Badiou, I would like to sketch the proposal of possible directions that worldly faith in the Event could take.
The initial, Christological, question underlying Bonhoeffer's theology (Who Christ really is for us today?) led him eventually to the ecclesiological formula: "The church is a church only when it is there for others." clvii For ecclesia to meet this requirement, it has to develop the tools that will enable it to guard itself from various forms of idolatry, commercialism, dogmatism, totalitarianism, sectarianism, and xenophobia that may be produced by its own structures and ideologies. It seems to me that both Bonhoeffer and
Badiou have something to say about the challenges to be faced by such a radical ecclesiology.
Few have experienced the consequences of religion being used by the political order as a tool to mobilize forces for its agendas more acutely than Bonhoeffer. Bethge, his closest friend to whom most prison letters were addressed, asks rhetorically, "Is there not concealed behind our religious trends our ungovernable urge toward … power-in the name of God to do what we want, and in the name of the Christian worldview to stir up and play people against one another?" clviii Those immersed in the forms of religion that legitimate their own culture are particularly susceptible to ignorance regarding the deep connection between religion and the will to power. Unlike religious institutions (in the Bonhoefferian sense), the church that is rooted in Jesus's being for others has the potential to offer the world a vision that relativizes all social orders. clix Commenting on Matt. 7:21, where Jesus says, "Not all who say to me, 'Lord, Lord', will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only those who do the will of my Father in heaven," Bonhoeffer warns against "a kind of confession of Christ that Jesus rejects because it is in contradiction with doing the will of God." clx Jesus rejects such a confession, Bonhoeffer, explains, "because it arises out of our own human knowledge of good and evil." clxi Therefore, the ecclesia must always remain aware of the danger consisting in a religious dogmatism that equips the believer with the categories of good and evil without incorporating personal relation with God as the measure against which his or her life is to be discerned.
clxii That should remind us of the two religious dimensions that Bonhoeffer aimed to overcome for the sake of a worldly faith, namely other-worldliness (metaphysics) and inwardness (individualism). By making us servants of the "heavenly God," who does not have the human face of Jesus, religion almost automatically establishes the sphere of the sacred and that of the profane, and in so doing makes us see ourselves as privileged or pure.
In such a divided reality, those who do not confess our God sooner or later become our enemies. While narrowly comprehended, religious affiliation generates the distinctions that divide us into hostile camps, the Christ of the nonreligious faith "wants us to be in the midst of our enemies, just as she was." clxiii The religion that Bonhoeffer seeks to deconstruct is the "habit of heart that allows us to approach the world without love, even while declaring that we are doing just the opposite. self radically available to the world-to the point of abuse, marginalization, and (in our times above all) irrelevance-the church is responsible for preventing the gospel from becoming too available, that is to say, too commercialized, too marketable, too self-evident, too easy to talk about, too amenable to the "evangelistic sales pitch." clxviii If being a Christian is not to be reduced to believing in certain metaphysical doctrines and practicing certain religious rituals, the church has to keep its rituals and its doctrines, so to speak, as a secret, as a mystery, and as a gift received through revelation-a gift that should be shared with others in such a way that those who accept it are aware of both the value and the cost of discipleship in Christ. All that the world should see on the outside, while observing Christians, is a "secular" and "religionless" being-there-for-others. At the same time, the church cannot forget that the power of Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God resides in the realization that "our God"
is also the "God of others." A contemporary French theologian Joseph Moingt insists that we have access to God only insofar as we are prepared to forgo attempts at making God "our God," our property, God in our image, the custodian of our past, who is important to us as a confirmation of our common identity-in brief, insofar as we are prepared to let God be "other" and exist for others. clxix This resonates with Bonhoeffer's own view that the church must understand itself as the church for the world, as the church for others, independent of their religiosity and religion. clxx This tension between God's "availability" that has to be proclaimed as the good news for the world and the church's mission to protect the mysteries of faith against banalization and commercialization must not be easily resolved: the community of the faithful should build its identity by striving to embrace that paradox.
Badiou also emphasizes that the subjects to the truth of the resurrection, by the very fidelity toward that truth, are enabled to "refuse to submit to the order of the world as it has existed and instead struggle for a new one." clxxi The community of the believers is constituted by their faithfulness toward the event which, in turn, allows them-and only them-to see the truth that it communicates. While the State's interest is always in reforming the world, the believers are not interested in reforming the existing reality but in the birth of a new one.
Therefore, those who feed on the truth-event adopt "a necessary distance from the State and from what corresponds to the State in people's consciousness: the apparatus of opinion."
clxxii Following Paul, Badiou admonishes that "a truth is a serious and concentrated procedure, which must never enter into competition with established opinions." clxxiii This distinction between the opinions and the truth may suggest the same anti-idolatrous tendency that underlies Bonhoeffer's reflection on the arcane discipline: the church must not allow the truth of the resurrection to be "sold" to the world as one of many products, since that would cause the specifically Christian discourse of the evental grace to degenerate into something we might call the "market-discourse" or, somewhat ironically, the "American discourse."
Badiou sees the ecclesia as a "site of contestation that requires nothing less than an active and never-ending pursuit of clarification to remain faithful to the truth-event that is clxxviii If Terry Eagleton is right when he suggests that "for the radical, the real monsters are ourselves," clxxix then the task of diagnosing the multiple flows of power with which the church is confronted at "the end of history" must be accompanied by a renewed analysis of the ways in which the church itself is the product of these very powers. Going beyond Badiou, this means cultivating an awareness that if the ecclesia is truly to be itself in today's world, instead of hovering on the margins to keep itself pure, it should rather realize that its proclamation of the lordship of Christ depends on a network of complex relationships. That means that, far from seeking uniformity and discipline, disagreement can be welcome and even the authorities can vulnerably put themselves in question. In brief, the church must become "a site of contestation" rather than the "custodian of the fundamentals," a place that is hospitable to conflict and crisis rather than an institution searching, at any cost, for some kernel of unity upon which differing sides can easily agree and move forward.
clxxx
In traditional (Augustinian) terms, it means that ecclesia must be semper reformanda, which is to say, it needs to preserve a constant potential for radical reformation that can be drawn only from the novelty of evental grace. The church, like every institution, is susceptible to the tendency of withdrawing into a particularism of its own which can easily lead to its becoming parochial and eventually degenerate into a private but harmless eccentricity of a minority. That is why Badiou's emphasis on the uniqueness of evental grace as the only source of the subject's identity appears to be so relevant. Christ's resurrection summons ecclesia to become a "new Israel," and not a "second Israel," i.e., another particular community alongside Israel and many others; it engenders the courage to be constantly people on the way, boldly crossing all borders, instead of turning the faith in the Resurrected into a "heritage of the fathers," an inherited property which reduces the "Father of Jesus Badiou's attempt to "extract a formal, wholly secularized conception of grace" cxc from the Pauline texts and to exploit their political potential while disregarding Paul's theological commitments stems, basically, from his rejection of transcendence as such. Bonhoeffer's nonreligious interpretation aimed to redefine God's transcendence understood in a sense of other-worldliness so that it could be found in immanence ("God is beyond even in the middle of our lives" cxci ), that is to say, in the "neighbor who is within reach in any given situation." cxcii The God of Bonhoeffer is, in a sense, an absent God, a God who in the midst of the world remains invisible and silent until Christians make God present and visible by their participation in Jesus's being for others. While Bonhoeffer radically reinterprets the traditional Christian notion of transcendence, Badiou simply does away with it. In this regard, he represents "a shared new determination to grapple with the legacy of the death of God in a deeper way than ever before, re-making philosophy from the ground up as a thinking 'without God'." cxciii When Badiou speaks of the "death of God," what he means by "God" is not only the metaphysical God with whose death Nietzsche and Heidegger were concerned (the end of onto-theology) and whose death enables the return of a "more divine" God. In light of his ontology, all three meanings of the word "God" that he distinguishes, i.e., the living God of religion, the conceptual God of metaphysics, and the God of the poets, become answers. At the same time, however, both Bonhoeffer and Badiou make us face the right questions, the questions that are relevant to our contemporary condition. The "world come of age" needs a "Christianity come of age," a church built on worldly faith in the "resurrection
